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Reflections on Lisa Hilbink’s Assessment of Ran Hirschl’s Criticism of Juristocracy

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Abstract: Reflections on Professor Lisa Hilbink’s critique of Professor Ran Hirschl’s perspective on kritarchy (or kratocracy or dikastocracy, to which he refers as juristocracy; i.e., rule by judges); reflections on the reality that the concepts of democracy and rights are not coherent as currently understood, and that neither judges nor legislators possess the ethics and independence necessary to effectively exercise constitutional control; and, criticism of the misuse of linguistics to confuse issues such as democracy and rights and on the dubious nature of current concepts of constitutional control.

Key words: Juristocracy, kritarchy, kratocracy, dikastocracy, legislators, judges, democracy, liberty, pluralism, rights.

Introduction:

This year I ran across an article published by Professor Lisa Hilbink, PhD, entitled “Beyond Manicheanism: Assessing the New Constitutionalism”.  It was published in the Maryland Law Review[1] over two decades ago.  The version I ran across was an unfinished draft of the article which she shared on Academia.edu during 2005 and one sentence criticizing the now late professor Ran Hirschl, PhD, set me off in an unexpected direction.  Dr. Hilbink wrote, at least in the February 2005 draft, that: “Hirschl’s central argument is based on a stark distinction between courts as insulated,…semi-autonomous, professional policy-making bodies on the one hand, and legislatures as faithful mirrors of popular will, on the other.” 

While I tend to side strongly with critiques of what Dr. Hircshl referred to as “Juristocracy” in his lauded 2005 book, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism;[2] the quote made me focus on the reality that if legislatures ever truly reflected the beliefs and goals of their electorates, that is certainly not the case today thus, “faithful mirrors of popular will” they certainly are not.  Today, their constituents are not those who “vote” them into office but those who finance their campaigns and the political parties that post them.  Of course, that’s also true of heads of state and chief executives.  Thus, while unelected judges are all too frequently oligarchical and elitist, so too, for the most part, are legislators and the political heads of executive branches. 

That should certainly not be the case but, as long as political campaigns are costly and privately financed by non-voters (as demanded by the United States Supreme Court[3]), then the possibility of elected officials acting in the interests of the voters who elect them rather than in the interest of the billionaires who fund them is, at best, improbable.  Especially since so much of the expense of being elected eventually winds up in the coffers of the legacy media, a complex of simplistic organizations owned and controlled by the same billionaires who provide the bulk of the political contributions.

The Relative Positions of Dr. Hirschl and Dr. Hilbink:

Dr. Hirschl’s core argument with respect to kritarchy (or kratocracy or dikastocracy, to which he refers as juristocracy; i.e., rule by judges), is, as I understand it, that the post-World War II global trend of empowering courts and recognizing inviolable constitutionalizing rights as a means to limit “democratic abuse of democracy and social justice” (an ironic turn of phrase), is a ruse, and that the reality is that the expansion of John Marshall’s concept of judicial review and judicial constitutional control[4], which morphed in the twentieth century into the concept of judicial activism and the organic constitution, was instead driven by threatened political elites, economic stakeholders, and judicial leaders engaging in “hegemonic preservation” to protect their policy preferences from majoritarian politics.

Dr. Hilbink’s position, on the other hand, criticizes Dr. Hirschl’s “hegemonic preservation” theory which she describes as positing that the global expansion of judicial power is not a neutral victory for human rights but a strategic move by a tripartite coalition of threatened political elites, economic elites seeking to lock in neoliberal market policies and high-court judiciaries seeking to protect their interests from the “vicissitudes of democratic politics”, something accomplished by shifting decision-making from majoritarian legislatures to insulated courts.  She does so although acknowledging the empirical weight of Dr. Hirschl’s case studies, by arguing that Dr. Hirschl fell victim to the exact same Manichean trap as the liberal “enthusiasts” he criticizes. According to her, where the legal scholars Dr. Hirschl criticizes romanticize judges as uniquely noble, principled actors operating entirely above the political fray, Dr. Hirschl swings to the opposite extreme asserting that he views judges and institutional design as uniquely self-interested and collusive. While admitting that a court’s origins may not always (or even usually) be pure, she asserts that that does not necessarily mean that long-term institutional impacts are malevolent.  In conjunction with the foregoing she differentiates the mother of judicial activism, the United States Supreme Court, from constitutional courts and courts vested with constitutional authority as well as general oversight of legal systems in other countries, seeming to admit that Dr. Hirschl may be correct with respect to the former, but not necessarily with respect to the latter.  In that regard, Dr. Hilbink argues that the judicial role in constitutional control is not monolithic and instead, involves massive structural variations such as how judges are appointed, their legal subcultures, and their professional norms, all of which dictate whether a court acts as an elite shield or a democratically responsive partner.  Dr. Hilbink finally notes that Dr. Hirschl relies heavily on a rigid dichotomy between “law” and “politics”, implying that there are questions that are purely moral or political and that transferring them to a courtroom strips them of democratic legitimacy to which she counters by asserting that that judicial review and legislative policy-making can be interactive and mutually supportive rather than inherently adversarial.

Notwithstanding their differing perspectives, however, both challenge the romantic, mainstream view that the global expansion of judicial review is simply a natural, benevolent evolution toward human rights and social justice, both arguing that while constitutional courts are highly effective at handling procedural liberties, collective identity, or negative rights, they rarely advance economic equity or redistributive justice and both view the insulation of policy-making from direct popular democracy as a defining hallmark of modern constitutional frameworks.

An interesting debate and convincing performance by Dr. Hilbink.  My perspective is somewhat different and more analytically pessimistic for different reasons.  I see both centered on the impact of what purports to be democracy in governance and on which of two competing institutions can best reflect and protect it.  But, to a great extent, I believe that democracy is and has always been, at least in its current incarnation, illusory and confusing.  If the argument is better defined and more limited so as to involve only the concept of majority rule, then any delegation to a select group, whether unelected judges or elected legislators, in each case, where immunity for ignoring the will of the majority is immune from consequences (other than non-reelection or reappointment), has historically been doomed to failure.  And the obverse, direct democracy, as Socrates is reputed to have observed and experienced, is not an answer.

My Observations:

With reference to the foregoing, I have long felt that linguistic abuse as a means of obfuscating reality has, to some extent, been a weapon well-used by lawyers, politicians, journalists and academics to confuse the electorate.  I have written concerning that as it applies to the term “democracy” which, rather than reflect the concept of majority rule, has been so loaded down with contradictory concepts and platitudes as to make it, as a concept, unworkable.  That is especially true when democracy is defined as a concept melding majority rule with liberty and pluralism, each of which is at odds with the others.  As opposed to majority rule, liberty is a purely individualistic concept grounded on individual autonomy and pluralism is grounded on the rights of minorities vis a vis both individual and majority rights.  The term “rights” is as incoherent but for different reasons.  Rights purport to involve something inherent rather than granted and thus subject to neither conditions nor limitations, no matter how reasonable.  How unreasonable is that?  Based on that definition, no rights exist, have ever existed and can never exist, as is demonstrated by the reality that rights are respected by governments only when convenient.  The purported solution?  Keep expanding their scope into even more improbable, albeit worthy areas (like the environment, peace and social welfare).  That is not to imply that something aspirationally similar to rights, perhaps involving mandatory government spending priorities, would not be meritorious, but all we have, anywhere, are artfully phrased non-functional “guarantees”.  I note that “guarantees” are generally unattainable oxymorons, at best implying reasonable efforts.

Conclusions: So, what was the question???

Well, I think the question relating to my diatribe concerning the nature of democracy and of rights was, or should have been, where does the concept of a constitution fit into the foregoing?  Or perhaps, where should it fit in.  Not in the organic sense of establishing and regulating the branches and organs of governance but in the more esoteric sense of seeking to create a just and workable balance between majority rule, liberty and pluralism and to create a mechanism to at least approach the concept of rights.  And to determine just how calcified related decisions should be, calcified in the sense that a constitution seeks to impose current values on future generations while ignoring important aspects concerning the values of generations that preceded us.  That would then bring us to the questions raised by Drs. Hirschl and Hilbink as to what kind of institution could most effectively act as the enforcement mechanism for constitutional goals, dictates and aspirations.  At that point, their arguments would acquire significant relevance, although perhaps as starting points for evolution towards a truly efficient, just and objective means of constitutional control, something which may well prove as solely aspirational as the “rights” and respect for “democracy” that most constitutions purport to guarantee.  At least so long as the humans involved remain so prone to elitist self-preservation and the cancerous quest for ever increasing control, regardless of their roles.

References:

Calvo Mahé, Guillermo (2026): “Of Counterintuitive Courts, Constitutions and Bibles“; The Inannite Review on Substack, October 06, 2026, available at https://guillermocalvomah.substack.com/p/of-counterintuitive-courts-constitutions?r=lwzkv&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web.

Calvo Mahé, Guillermo. “A Very Brief Observation Concerning the Concept of Treason in a Pluralistic Democracy”; The Inannite Review, Substack, Aug. 2, 2026, available at https://substack.com/@guillermocalvomah/note/p-209521381?r=lwzkv&utm_source=notes-share-action&utm_medium=web.

Calvo Mahé, Guillermo. “Motley Constitutionalism: A Labyrinthine Aphorism”; Medium, 30 July 2023, available at https://guillermo-calvo-mahe.medium.com/motley-constitutionalism-a-labyrinthine-aphorism-9270c689f12d.

Calvo Mahé, Guillermo (2026): “Of Counterintuitive Courts, Constitutions and Bibles”; The Inannite Review, Substack, Oct. 6, 2026, available at https://guillermocalvomah.substack.com/p/of-counterintuitive-courts-constitutions?r=lwzkv&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web.

Calvo Mahé, Guillermo. “Sobre el control y la revisión constitucional: Un análisis comparativo centrado en las repúblicas”; XII Foro de Tendencias Contemporáneas de Derecho, Universidad de Caldas, Nov. 2017, Manizales.

Hilbink, Lisa (2006): “Beyond Manicheanism: Assessing the New Constitutionalism”; 65 Md. L. Rev. 15 (2006); University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, Baltimore.

Hirschl, Ran (2004): Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism; Harvard University Press; Cambridge.

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© Guillermo Calvo Mahé; Manizales, 2026; all rights reserved.  Please feel free to share with appropriate attribution.

Guillermo (“Bill”) Calvo Mahé (a sometime poet and aspiring empirical philosopher) is a writer, political commentator and academic currently residing in the Republic of Colombia (although he has primarily lived in the United States of America of which he is also a citizen). Until 2017 he chaired the political science, government and international relations programs at the Universidad Autónoma de Manizales. Previously, he chaired the social studies and foreign language departments at the Eastern Military Academy in Huntington, New York. He is currently the publisher of the Inannite Review available at Substack.com; an intermittent commentator on radio and television in both Colombia and abroad (e.g., NewsX World in India); and, an occasional contributor to diverse periodicals and publications. He has academic degrees in political science (BA, The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina), law (JD, St. John’s University, School of Law), international legal studies (LL.M, the Graduate Division of the New York University School of Law) and translation and linguistic studies (GCTS, the University of Florida’s Center for Latin American Studies). However, he is also fascinated by mythology, religion, physics, astronomy and mathematics, especially with matters related to quanta, cosmology and cosmogony. He can be contacted at guillermo.calvo.mahe@gmail.com and much of his writing is available through his blog at https://guillermocalvo.com/.

[1] Hilbink, Lisa (2006): “Beyond Manicheanism: Assessing the New Constitutionalism”, 65 Md. L. Rev. 15 (2006); University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, Baltimore.

[2] Harvard University Press; Cambridge.  The book won the American Political Science Association’s Law & Courts Section 2021 Lasting Contribution Award.

[3] See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo (1976); Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010); McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014); Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz / Senator Ted Cruz Committee v. Federal Election Commission (2022); and Federal Election Commission v. NRSC (2026).

[4] Which I have criticized in diverse articles, some of which are listed at the conclusion of this article.

On the Nature and Malfunctioning of Constitutions

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Constitutions are inherently conservative antidemocratic instruments, attempts by the polity of a given time to control the decisions and practices of their progeny.  At their best, they are conservative in the sense, not of the policies they promote but rather, in the sense that they reject the opinions of any given period as absolute, instead insisting that they reflect the past (i.e., tradition), the present (seeking resolution to current tensions) and the future, although with reference to the future they tend less to respect than to bind.  Those burdened with the task of constitutional control (i.e., interpretation, implementation and enforcement) are purportedly bound by the constitution’s dictates based on earlier experiences (experiences perhaps not only no longer relevant but conceivably now proven wrong) while trying to resolve current tensions.  Not an enviable task.

In constitutional terms, the English common law did not recognize the authority of the past over the present insisting that no parliament or institution could bind another but it concurrently had to deal with the inherited Roman concepts of stare decises and res judicata, both demanding adherence to prior decisions, albeit binding on the judiciary but not the legislature.  Napoleon Bonaparte, based on libertarian and egalitarian instincts, rejected both stare decises and res judicata, insisting that judges be bound by broad legislatively enacted legal concepts embodied and logically organized into codes[1] which they were required to apply to the facts, using their own judgment and logic, to arrive at conclusions tailor made for the specific issues involved without regard for either the past or the future.  On the other hand, he insisted that judicial decisions be brief, limited to one sentence if possible, a dictate made ludicrous through us of the word “whereas” (in French, considérant) to link innumerable pages-long clauses to contextualize and explain the nature of and reasoning for a decision.

The constitution of the Republic of Colombia (where I now live after a lifetime in the United States), like the constitution of the Republic of India (also known as Bharat), is an extremely long tapestry of contradictory and unattainable premises and promises, albeit beautifully phrased and full of idealistic platitudes, in the case of Colombia, with four different supreme judicial bodies, each of which seems to take turns contradicting the others, and as elsewhere, each dominated by political rather than legal priorities.  To me they are both most useful as harbingers of the uselessness of constitutions incomprehensible to the people they are meant to govern, interpretable, if at all, only by purported experts frequently incapable of agreeing with each other.  As several of my students in classes on constitutional theory and on comparative politics have noted, a constitution, to really serve its purpose, ought to at least be comprehensible to people of average intelligence and education, even if it is, in practice, rarely really followed (as is much too frequently the case)[2].

Today, many, perhaps most, maybe even all constitutions are more like revered religious relics treasured by atheists because of their historical, cultural and monetary value than because of their intrinsic meaning.  Hence, in the United States of America for example, the meaning of the Constitution’s premises and pronouncements not only vary over time as it purportedly somehow seeks to remain relevant for resolution of legal and political tensions reflecting changing societal contexts, but even more so with respect to the immediate goals and aspirations of the political party that most recently appointed the membership of the judiciary, the judiciary which, in the United States, through usurpation[3], acquired the power and responsibility for constitutional control.  Hence, members of the United States Supreme Court may well change their constitutional interpretations based on whether or not the party that appointed them controls one or the other, or both of the other purportedly coequal branches of government.  Consequently, existential issues like states’ rights versus federal supremacy alternate in focus and importance, as does strict construction versus organic interpretation.

In the United States, the study and practice of “constitutional law” does not involve development of a profound understanding of hypotheses and theories involving the nature and roles of constitutions, their elements and how they should function in order to approximate the common welfare but rather, a tortured study of the history of Supreme Court decisions and how to best misinterpret them to support desired quotidian results. That leads to ludicrous decisions (sometimes resulting in equitable results) such as that in the famous (and now infamous) case of Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), where the court at the time discovered a penumbra of privacy emanating from perceived implied constitutional rights that created a right to an abortion, something none of the creators of the Bill of Rights would have supported, although they probably would have agreed that such a right probably existed based on the ninth and tenth amendments to the Constitution (the forgotten amendments) which provide that the Bill of Rights is not an exhaustive list of all human rights and sought (unsuccessfully) to restrict federal power to only what is explicitly stated in the Constitution. Specifically, the 9th Amendment protects rights not specifically listed while the 10th reserves all other powers for the states “or the people”.  Roe v Wade is only one of the more egregious instances of poor constitutional scholarship by those charged with constitutional control.  Other examples are myriad, especially those that virtually destroyed the constitutional concept of federalism on which the United States was based, at least what was left of it after the Civil War and the Wilson era constitutional amendments (the 16th through 19th amendments), through expansion of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, which grants Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with Indian tribes, coupled with the Supremacy Clause,  Article VI, Clause, which establishes that the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties constitute the “supreme law of the land”, albeit theoretically only in the areas covered by the twenty-seven specifically designated (“enumerated”) areas were power is withdrawn from the States and transferred by the Constitution to the federal government (Article I, Section 8).

Thus, while it is true that in theory constitutions are inherently conservative, antidemocratic instruments, in the case of the United States of America, the meaning of the constitution adopted in 1787 and implemented in 1788, at any given point in time, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the beholder, except, perhaps, for its organic functions, i.e., those that specify the institutions created for federal governance.  But even there, such functions, organization and modes of operation have proven not that difficult to manipulate, e.g., voting rights, apportionment, electoral districts, gerrymandering, prohibitions against convergence of legislative, executive and judicial powers[4], etc.  The result is, as I once wrote[5], a motley constitution, one court jesters (actually, wielders of considerable power both as advisors and as spies) might well be proud to call their own.

And unfortunately, in that respect, the United States Constitution is not unique.

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© Guillermo Calvo Mahé; Manizales, 2026; all rights reserved.  Please feel free to share with appropriate attribution.

Guillermo (“Bill”) Calvo Mahé (a sometime poet and aspiring empirical philosopher) is a writer, political commentator and academic currently residing in the Republic of Colombia (although he has primarily lived in the United States of America of which he is also a citizen). Until 2017 he chaired the political science, government and international relations programs at the Universidad Autónoma de Manizales. Previously, he chaired the social studies and foreign language departments at the Eastern Military Academy in Huntington, New York. He is currently the publisher of the Inannite Review available at Substack.com; an intermittent commentator on radio and television; and, an occasional contributor to diverse periodicals and publications. He has academic degrees in political science (BA, The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina), law (JD, St. John’s University, School of Law), international legal studies (LL.M, the Graduate Division of the New York University School of Law) and translation and linguistic studies (GCTS, the University of Florida’s Center for Latin American Studies). However, he is also fascinated by mythology, religion, physics, astronomy and mathematics, especially with matters related to quanta, cosmology and cosmogony. He can be contacted at guillermo.calvo.mahe@gmail.com and much of his writing is available through his blog at https://guillermocalvo.com/.

[1] An ancient perspective reflected notably in the codes of Hammurabi and Justinian, millennia apart.

[2] Interestingly, there are those, frequently highly intelligent comedians of a libertarian bent, who find dysfunctionality the best form of governance given, as Will Rogers once stated quoting Judge Gideon John Tucker that “No man’s life, liberty, or property are safe while the legislature is in session”, thus a functional constitution may be the most dangerous kind and the type most to be avoided.  It is sad to consider that the eminent Judge Tucker and Mr. Rogers may well have had a point.

[3] See, e.g., Calvo Mahé, Guillermo et. al. (Jiménez Ramírez, Milton Cesar, editor, 2020): “Capítulo I. Evolución del control de constitucionalidad en los estados unidos.”; El control de la constitucionalidad en episodios: acerca del control constitucional como límite al poder; Universidad de Caldas, Facultad de ciencias jurídicas y sociales; Bogotá.

[4] A prohibition made ludicrous in the case of administrative agencies which combine all three functions in a revolving door scheme where regulators and the regulated constantly trade places.

[5] Calvo Mahé, Guillermo (2023):  “Motley Constitutionalism: a labyrinthine aphorism”; Medium, July 30, 2023 available at https://guillermo-calvo-mahe.medium.com/motley-constitutionalism-a-labyrinthine-aphorism-9270c689f12d.

Paradoxical Reflections as 2025 Morphs into 2026

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Dateline, January 4, 2026

For many historians the assassinations of Roman reformers Tiberius Gracchus in 133 BCE and of his brother, Gaius Gracchus, in 121 BCE, both tribunes of the plebs who pushed for agrarian and social reforms against powerful Senate opposition, marked the end of the Roman Republic, at least in constitutional terms.  The rational system of governance represented by the Republic broke down after that with the dictatorships of Marius and Sulla, and then the triumvirates of Julius Caesar, Gnaeus Pompeius (self-denominated Magnus), and Marcus Licinius Crassus until Octavian Caesar initiated the Imperium a century later. 

In the case of the United States of North America (a more accurate name than the United States or the United States of America), constitutional order, at least involving the constitution usurpatively adopted in 1789, first broke down in 1861 with the war between the states (now usually referred to as the Civil War except among conservative Caucasians in the South where it is known as the War of Northern Aggression), being thereafter replaced by a militarily imposed new constitutional order which was, in turn, more legally replaced during the presidency of Woodrow Wilson by a new antifederalist centrist variant through adoption of the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th amendments, amendments which, because they virtually destroyed the Constitution’s federalist premises, could well be considered unconstitutional constitutional amendments as described by Professor Richard Albert of the University of Texas’ School of Law.  But the end of any semblance of constitutionalism in the United States entered its death throes, as did the concept of international law, during the presidency of William Jefferson Clinton in 1992, culminating in their absolute demise during the second term of the presidency of Donald John Trump.  By that time, most of those who, upon assuming office in the United States, whether civil or military, took an oath to “defend and protect the Constitution of the United States” in truth were dedicated to serving the dictates of the de facto Führer, a more accurate term for the dictatorial presidents of the United States that started with Mr. Clinton and reached a high point (so far) with the presidency of Donald Trump.  They (the de facto führers), in turn, along with most of the bureaucracy and the members of the United States Congress, owed their loyalty to the unelected, secretive, American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) which bought most of them with monetary contributions and “favors” and which in turn owed its fealty to the Hobbesian Zionist Israeli government.

The result, both domestically and internationally, was a return to what philosopher Thomas Hobbes had once described as “the State of Nature”, not a benevolent environmentally friendly status but one where brute power was the only reality that mattered.  In both cases, the Roman and that of the United States, indeed, in that of the entire global state system, the demise of constitutional government, in each case based on superficial principles of liberty and democracy, experienced a gradual, unperceived death which, by the time it had become permanent, was virtually ignored, unmourned by the vast majority of the populations they were meant to serve. 

Unbidden, the ancient Trojan prophetess Cassandra comes to mind as I write this, and the political prophets Aldous Huxley and his former student, Eric Arthur Blair (writing as George Orwell) as well, as do the warnings in the farewell addresses of presidents George Washington and Dwight David Eisenhower.  But all to no avail. 

In this world, evil, greed, impunity and hypocrisy seemingly always triumph.  At least where collectives are involved.  It turns out that collectives, meant to foster collaboration in the quest for mutual benefit instead serve as means for the most ruthless and selfish among us to concentrate power, facilitated by our fatal individual naiveté and immense capacity for self-deception.

As I all too frequently end my reflections nowadays, I again see Elphaba Thropp (albeit in her earlier 1930s incarnation in the film, “The Wizard of Oz”) slowly melting after having been inadvertently doused with water by the ingénue, Dorothy, with Elphaba desperately declaiming: “what a world, what a world”!

Welcome to 2026!

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© Guillermo Calvo Mahé; Manizales, 2026; all rights reserved.  Please feel free to share with appropriate attribution.

Guillermo (“Bill”) Calvo Mahé (a sometime poet and aspiring empirical philosopher) is a writer, political commentator and academic currently residing in the Republic of Colombia (although he has primarily lived in the United States of America of which he is also a citizen). Until 2017 he chaired the political science, government and international relations programs at the Universidad Autónoma de Manizales. Previously, he chaired the social studies and foreign language departments at the Eastern Military Academy in Huntington, New York. He is currently the publisher of the Inannite Review available at Substack.com; an intermittent commentator on radio and television; and, an occasional contributor to diverse periodicals and publications. He has academic degrees in political science (BA, The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina), law (JD, St. John’s University, School of Law), international legal studies (LL.M, the Graduate Division of the New York University School of Law) and translation and linguistic studies (GCTS, the University of Florida’s Center for Latin American Studies). However, he is also fascinated by mythology, religion, physics, astronomy and mathematics, especially with matters related to quanta, cosmology and cosmogony. He can be contacted at guillermo.calvo.mahe@gmail.com and much of his writing is available through his blog at https://guillermocalvo.com/.